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BETTER GO IT ALONE: AN EXTENSION OF FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES FOR INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS IN  
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION OPT-OUTS 
  BRIAN J. SHEA* 
ABSTRACT 
Securities class actions provide a vehicle for plaintiffs to recover billions 
of dollars in settlement awards. Given the prevalence of institutional inves-
tors in the market for publicly traded securities, it is no surprise that large 
investment funds are often implicated as lead plaintiffs in securities class 
actions. Despite having recoverable claims in many of these settlements, 
these investment funds often fail to participate in the action on behalf of 
their beneficiaries (their investors). Some scholars argue that fund managers 
have a fiduciary obligation to participate in claim filing and monitoring pro-
cesses in an effort to recover settlement awards and to maximize the value 
of their beneficiaries’ investments. Courts have yet to hold fund managers 
liable for failure to do so. 
This Note explores a separate but related phenomenon: the increased 
prevalence of class action “opt-outs” in which a plaintiff may choose not 
to be a part of the action in favor of pursuing a separate action, and hope-
fully recover more than would be available within the class action structure. 
Inherent in the opt-out calculus is the risk of receiving nothing at all. Given 
this phenomenon, this Note asks whether it would make sense to extend fidu-
ciary duties to contemplate opt-out behavior in an effort to encourage fund 
managers to monitor those securities class actions that implicate their 
respective funds. According to this argument, a fund manager would have 
a duty to opt out when the recovery outside the class action was likely 
greater, and when there was a reasonable likelihood that such recovery 
could be obtained. 
At the moment, such an extension would not be appropriate. A clear de-
parture from case law related to fiduciary duties and officer liability, such 
an extension would also inject too much legally encouraged risk taking into 
the capital markets; it would undermine many of the valid policy objectives 
of the securities class action; and it would place an undue burden on fund 
managers to take monitoring obligations to unprecedented levels. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Today’s securities class action settlement pipeline stands at $18 billion.1 
Although the total number of securities class actions filed in 2013 was some-
what lower than in previous years, seven of the twenty-five largest settle-
ments in history were approved in 2013.2 The top settlements involved 
companies such as Bank of America, AIG, Lehman Brothers, Citigroup, 
Countrywide, Adelphia, and Schering-Plough, to name a few.3 
As owners of the majority of publicly traded equity securities in the 
United States, institutional investors—pension funds in particular—reaped 
the majority of these settlement profits. The Regents of the University of 
California, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CALPRS), 
the New York State Common Retirement Fund, New York City Pension 
Funds, Plumbers & Pipefitters National Pension Fund, and United Associ-
ation of Local Union Officers & Employees Pension were among the pri-
mary institutions to recoup large sums for their beneficiaries by participating 
in these actions.4 
An overview of lead plaintiffs in the securities class action space 
would lead the casual observer to conclude that institutional investors like 
those mentioned above would be actively involved in filing claims on 
behalf of their beneficiaries. Nevertheless, several empirical analyses in 
this field of institutional behavior suggest the contrary—as of 2005, it was 
estimated that slightly more than $1 billion was left on the table by non-
filing institutions each year.5 Several possible explanations exist as to why 
                                                                                                                         
1 Securities Class Action Services, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES INC. 
(ISS), http://www.issgovernance.com/governance-solutions/securities-class-action-services/ 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2015). ISS, which is the source of much of the data in this Note, is a 
large proxy advisory and corporate governance firm. In March of 2014, ISS was acquired 
by Vestar Capital Partners, a leading middle-market private equity firm. See  Vestar Capital 
Partners Completes Acquisition of Institutional Shareholder Services, REUTERS (Apr. 30, 
2014, 11:51 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/30/ny-vestar-capital-idUSnBw 
306292a+100+BSW20140430 (including company profiles of both ISS and Vestar). 
2 See Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings, 2013 Year in Review 1 
(2014), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2013/Cornerstone-Re 
search-Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2013-YIR.pdf [hereinafter 2013 Cornerstone Report] 
(“Plaintiffs filed 166 new federal class action securities cases (filings) in 2013—fourteen 
more than in 2012. This number is 13 percent below the historical average of 191 … between 
1997 and 2012.”). 
3 See Securities Class Action Services, The SCAS 100 for 1H 2014, INSTITUTIONAL 
SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, INC. 4 (2014), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/library 
/securities-class-action-services-top-100-settlements-1h-2014/ (listing the top 100 settlements 
as of July, 2014).  
4 See id. at 11 (listing institutional lead plaintiff participation for the top 100 settlements). 
5 See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: 
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to 
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institutional investors with provable losses failed to file claims on behalf 
of their investors.6  
Some scholars argue that failure on the part of pension fund managers 
to pursue these settlements should be evaluated as potential breaches of 
fiduciary duty under Delaware’s Caremark decision.7 As applied, this stan-
dard holds that institutional investors have a good faith obligation to ensure 
that their fund has adequate monitoring systems in place to identify and 
process claims—in essence, to monitor the settlement pipeline and partici-
pate when appropriate—and to periodically update these systems as prob-
lems arise.8 Courts have yet to codify this fiduciary obligation as it applies 
to investment fund managers; however, there is some evidence that it has 
been adopted in practice.9  
This Note expands upon the argument advanced by these scholars and 
practitioners in the context of class action “opt-outs.” Current empirical 
research suggests that the larger the award at stake in a securities class ac-
tion, the more likely it is that at least one member of the class will choose 
to go it alone—opt out—in order to pursue a separate lawsuit against the 
defendant.10 According to this research, the primary reason that class action 
participants choose to pursue individual actions is the potential for a larger 
recovery in the end.11 The study is keen to point out that the legal strategy 
                                                                                                                         
Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 412 (2005). The 
Cox and Thomas study was the first to explore the fiduciary obligations of fund managers 
in this context. Their study was empirical in nature, although the authors openly acknowl-
edge their small sample size. Id. 
6 Id. at 413; see infra Part II. 
7 Id. (citing In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)). 
8 Id. 
9 See, e.g., About Class Actions, SPECTOR ROSEMAN KODROFF & WILLIS, P.C. (2011), 
http://www.srkw-law.com/about-class-actions.html (“While the duties of an institutional 
investor will depend greatly on the jurisdiction where the investor is located and on the 
specific facts of the situation, acting as Lead Plaintiff may help ensure that the trustees of 
the fund are discharging their fiduciary duties.”); Leaving Money on the Table? Investment 
Advisor Responsibility for Client Class Action Claims, EDWARDS WILDMAN LLP (Apr. 10, 
2005), http://www.edwardswildman.com/insights/PublicationDetail.aspx?publication=3426 
(“Advisors should now be reviewing existing advisory relationships and establishing and 
implementing new procedures ....”).  
10  See Amir Rozen et al., Opt-Out Cases in Securities Class Action Settlements, 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 1, 1 (2013), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/getattach 
ment/7cf8bd53-9e0b-45be-b4b3-3d810dfe2be3/Opt-Out-Cases-in-Securities-Class-Action 
-Settlemen.aspx. This study was a joint effort of Cornerstone Research and Latham & 
Watkins to analyze public information regarding judgments and settlements from opt-outs 
between 1996 and 2011. Id.  
11 See id. at 5. 
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of opting out also carries with it greater risks of receiving no settlement 
award at all.12 
To what extent should the fiduciary duties of fund managers (principally 
those of large pension funds) extend to opt-outs in securities class actions?13 
This Note posits and assesses the argument that fund managers, as trustees, 
owe an extended fiduciary responsibility to their beneficiaries that includes, 
at minimum, monitoring standards to determine whether the potential re-
covery could be greater if the fund opts out of a given class action. This duty 
would require fund managers to consider the potential recovery and assess 
the risks and rewards involved in opting out. As the law currently stands, 
there is no clear legal precedent available to hold fund managers liable for 
failure to file a claim in a particular class action—although investors have 
sued under such theories—not to mention failure to assess the risks and re-
wards involved in opting out. Caremark provides some guidance to investors, 
although this Note readily acknowledges Delaware courts’ reluctance to 
broaden the scope of fiduciary duties to corporate inaction of this nature.14 
It is undoubtedly reasonable for an investor to expect that those who 
manage his or her portfolio will remain vigilant as to potential class action 
claims, especially given the recent trend toward larger settlements. Alt-
hough some might advocate for a full expansion of liability to include opt-out 
assessment under a modified Caremark standard,15 such a solution is in-
appropriate and unfeasible. This approach is improper for several reasons: 
First, it frustrates the purposes of shareholder class actions by encouraging 
strategic behavior. Second, it places an unnecessary burden on fund man-
agers to do more than simply monitor their involvement in shareholder liti-
gation and to file claims on behalf of their beneficiaries. Last, it exposes 
investors to risky speculation that may result in substantial loss, which, if 
reeking of gross negligence, may in and of itself constitute a breach of 
duty of care.16 
                                                                                                                         
12 Id. (“In addition to giving up their share of the class action settlement ... the plaintiffs 
were forced to pay the defendant’s legal fees.”).  
13 This Note does not distinguish at great length between managers of specific types of 
funds or consider their qualification as investment advisers under the Investment Advisers 
Act. Rather, the discussion broadly refers to “fund managers” as those individuals who are 
responsible for implementing a fund’s investing strategy and managing its portfolio. These 
individuals serve as the trustees on behalf their investors. See generally Definition of Fund 
Manager, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fundmanager.asp.  
14 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 
A.2d 1262, 1273 (Del. Ch. 2008); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 
959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).  
15 See Cox & Thomas, supra note 5, at 413. 
16 Furthermore, this Note does not distinguish between various levels of risk that may 
attach to specific funds. Of course, behavior that is proper for a high-risk investment fund 
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Part I provides a brief background on the current securities class action 
environment, followed by an overview of the mechanics of filing claims in 
securities class actions. Part II discusses current scholarship as it relates to 
the fiduciary duties of fund managers and the analytical framework that has 
been adopted following Caremark. Part III then applies that framework to 
the behavior of fund managers in large-scale securities class actions and 
considers the optimal strategies that should be pursued by these managers 
on behalf of their beneficiaries, ultimately concluding that the current frame-
work as articulated by Delaware courts is insufficient to address the risks 
inherent in class action opt-outs. 
I. THE CURRENT SECURITIES CLASS ACTION ENVIRONMENT 
Each year, well over 100 securities class actions are filed in the United 
States.17 According to Cornerstone Research, 166 federal securities class ac-
tion cases were filed in 2013, a slight increase over 2012, although roughly 
thirteen percent below the national average observed since the 1995 Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).18 Broadly speaking, class actions 
resulting from alleged securities fraud appear on a daily basis in notable busi-
ness news publications and remain a centerpiece of the national discourse 
surrounding the right of investors to recover for corporate wrongs.19 
                                                                                                                         
may be inappropriate for certain low-risk pension funds. Acknowledging these distinct 
risk profiles further supports the conclusion of this Note, as its discussion of fiduciary 
duties proceeds with the low-risk pension fund manager in mind. For a greater discussion 
of duty of care cases, see infra note 128. 
17 See 2013 Cornerstone Report, supra note 2, at 3.  
18 Id. at 1. 
19 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, New Hurdle in Investors’ Class Actions, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/business/Justices-rule-on-class-actions-for-secu 
rities-fraud.html?_r=0 (discussing the Supreme Court’s controversial ruling in Halliburton 
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014), which was considered a minor victory 
for corporate defendants at the expense of investor plaintiffs seeking to bring class action 
claims); Greg Stohr, Investor Class Actions Seen at Risk in Halliburton Case, BLOOMBERG 
(Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-27/investor-class-actions-seen-
at-risk-in -halliburton-case.html (referring to the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in 
Halliburton).  
Securities fraud cases have become an industry unto themselves even 
as Congress has tried to rein them in. More than 4,000 class-action suits 
have been filed since 1996, producing almost $80 billion in settlements .... 
Accords involving Enron Corp. and WorldCom Inc. alone totaled more 
than $13 billion, and Bank of America Corp. last year agreed to pay $2.4 
billion to settle investor claims over its Merrill Lynch & Co. acquisition. 
Pfizer Inc. (PFE), Vivendi SA and Amgen Inc. (AMGN) are among the 
companies with pending lawsuits that could be affected by the high 
court case.  
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Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over securities fraud class 
actions since the enactment of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 
Act of 1998 (SLUSA).20 As a practical matter, almost all securities class ac-
tions settle before trial.21 A number of key trends emerged in 2013: (1) the 
majority of claims were brought under SEC Rule 10b-5, the catch-all provi-
sion for securities fraud; (2) the median lag time between the end of the al-
leged class period and the filing date of the lawsuit became shorter; (3) health 
care, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical companies represented the largest 
industry group among class action targets; and (4) the vast majority of fil-
ings occurred in the Second and Ninth Circuits.22 
The class action is a powerful legal tool used to provide relief to mul-
tiple individuals who otherwise would not have the incentive to pursue their 
claims individually; in the aggregate, these claims address widespread harm 
resulting from corporate fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities.23 Since the codification of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, scholars have 
widely debated the justifications and effects of these actions.24 The aca-
demia repeats several major policy justifications for this device, including: 
(1) class actions provide a solution to the economic obstacle of gathering 
many small claims together into an amalgamation that can support the cost 
of litigation;25 (2) class actions arguably create a level playing field for 
                                                                                                                         
Id.; see generally Brief for Financial Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-317); Brief 
for DRI—The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Erica 
P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-317). 
20 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. L. 105-353, 
§16(b)–(c), 112 Stat. 3227, 3228 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78bb(f)(2012)). 
21 See Kevin M. LaCroix, Rare Securities Suit Trial Produces Jury Verdict Against 
Former Longtop Financial CEO, THE D&O DIARY (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.dando 
diary.com/2014/11/articles/securities-litigation/rare-securities-suit-trial-produces-jury-ver 
dict-against-former-longtop-financial-cfo/ (“[T]rial in securities class action lawsuits [are] 
extremely rare .... [T]here have been only 24 securities class action lawsuits that have 
gone to verdict since Congress enacted the [PSLRA].”). LaCroix estimates that less than 
half of one percent of all cases filed during this period have gone to trial. Id. He explores 
various explanations for this settlement preference beyond the fear of an exorbitantly large 
jury verdict, e.g., fraud exclusions in D&O insurance policies. Id.  
22 See 2013 Cornerstone Report, supra note 2, at 1.  
23 See Janet Cooper Alexander, An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United 
States, Presented Conference: Debates over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 
Geneva, Switzerland, at 1, July 21–22, 2000 [hereinafter Alexander Presentation]; see 
generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  
24  See, e.g., Alexander Presentation, supra note 23; BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & 
GROSSMAN, LITIGATING SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS § 1.01 (2014) (providing a history 
of securities class actions beginning with the 1966 amendments to Rule 23).  
25 Id. at 1. 
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individuals with less economic power, who might otherwise be disadvan-
taged under the legal system;26 (3) class actions also serve the valuable 
social goals of deterrence and compensation, thus providing the appropriate 
incentives for corporations and corporate actors to pay for and internalize 
the true cost of their conduct;27 and (4) they also eliminate the need to re-
litigate common claims in similar small-scale cases, thus bringing efficiency 
to the overall court system.28 From a practical standpoint, class actions cre-
ate incentives for attorneys to represent and aggressively advocate on be-
half of individuals who would not otherwise be able to obtain meaningful 
representation due to the costs associated with litigation.29 
In the United States, class actions are governed by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.30 Although all class actions are governed by the same rule, 
several distinct categories of actions have emerged: consumer rights, secu-
rities and antitrust, environmental, mass torts, and civil rights.31 It is worth 
denoting these categories in order to cabin the discussion of opt-outs within 
the securities context. Needless to say, civil rights and environmental class 
actions deal with completely distinct issues that are beyond the scope of 
this Note. 
A. The Private Right of Action for Securities Fraud 
In general, securities class action claims in the U.S. are alleged as viola-
tions of the federal securities laws based on misrepresentations concerning 
the financial and business conditions of a company.32 These claims are often 
brought under section17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”), 
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), and SEC 
Rule 10b-5.33 The statutes and rules prohibit fraud by any “person”in con-
nection with purchase or sale of a security.34 Because securities are sold in 
                                                                                                                         
26 Id. 
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 2. 
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
31 See Alexander Presentation, supra note 23, at 2–3. 
32 See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 24. 
33 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77q (2012); Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
§78j (2012); 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (2014). 
34 A corporation may be liable for violations of the Exchange Act based on the defini-
tion of “person”under Section 3(a)(9). See 15 U.S.C. §78c (2012). Section 20(a) gives rise 
to joint and several liability for a person who controls any person liable under the Exchange 
Act. See 15 U.S.C. §78t (2012). It is worth noting that some courts have imposed 10b-5 
liability under the tort doctrine of respondeat superior, which renders an employer liable for 
wrongs by an employee committed within the scope of employment. See generally Hollinger 
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large numbers or blocks to many disparate investors, it is easy to under-
stand why the class action is a useful vehicle to remedy the harm felt by 
many individual investors who would not otherwise have the means or the 
incentive to bring a direct action against the company. It is also easy to 
understand why the class action might be ill-suited or disadvantageous to 
institutional investors who hold a larger portion of the securities sold, and 
who would otherwise have an incentive to bring a separate action. 
Section 17(a) provides the following: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities .... 
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communi-
cation in interstate commerce ...  directly or indirectly— 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of 
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order 
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading; or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.35 
The statute broadly prohibits (1) the employment of any device, scheme, 
or artifice to defraud (2) in the offer or sale of any securities. 
Similarly, section10(b) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or 
of any facility of any national securities exchange .... 
… 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not 
so registered, ...  any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors.36 
Thus, section 10(b) prohibits (1) using any manipulative or deceptive 
device in contravention of the SEC’s rules (2) in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of securities.37 As written, section 10(b) does not limit itself 
merely to deception of a purchaser or seller, but rather applies to any de-
ception used “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”38  
                                                                                                                         
v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Network Equip. Tech., Inc., 
Litig., 762 F.Supp. 1359 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
35 15 U.S.C. §77q(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
36 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
37 Id. 
38 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997). 
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The SEC adopted Rule 10b-5 pursuant to its rulemaking authority: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or 
of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or] 
… 
 (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security.39 
In essence, a private right of action for damages under these provisions 
can be broken down into the following elements: (1) a material misrepre-
sentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) in connection with a purchase or 
sale of a security; (4) reliance, often referred to as “fraud-on-the-market” 
in public securities cases; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation, that is, 
a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss.40 
Materiality in the securities fraud context is a determination of whether 
there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact 
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly 
altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” 41  “Scienter” is 
defined as “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”42 
From a historical standpoint, although the relevant provisions of the 
federal securities action had their genesis in the ’33 Act, the securities class 
action did not take hold until Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
was fundamentally changed in 1966.43 Under these 1966 changes, the out-
come of a class action became binding on nonparticipating class members 
who received notice of the action and were given the opportunity to opt 
in.44 Provided the case satisfies Rule 23’s requirements, the court may 
certify the class action and the outcome is binding.45 
Corporations and the defense bar became critical of securities class ac-
tions in the 1980s and 1990s on the basis that the class action structure 
                                                                                                                         
39 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (2014). 
40 See, e.g., Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). 
41 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988). 
42 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). 
43 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 24, at § 1.01[1][a].  
44 Id. at § 101.1[1][b]. 
45 These requirements include numerosity of the class, commonality of legal or factual 
questions, adequacy of representative plaintiffs, and the requirement “that the questions 
of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members,” and that the class action is superior to other available methods of 
adjudication. Id.  
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was unfairly biased in favor of plaintiffs.46 Congress responded with the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), which im-
posed a number of procedural reforms and enhanced pleading standards.47 
Following the PSLRA, a plaintiff in a securities fraud case must “state 
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant 
acted with the required state of mind.”48 The Supreme Court in 2007 held 
that in order for an inference of scienter to qualify as “strong,” it “must be 
more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as 
compelling as any opposing inference of non-fraudulent intent.”49 Circuits 
are split as to how plaintiffs may give rise to a strong inference of scienter: in 
some, plaintiffs must allege facts to show that defendants had both motive 
and opportunity to commit fraud; in others, courts require facts constituting 
strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness; 
and others apply a “totality of circumstances” test for which a showing of 
motive and opportunity may be relevant but not dispositive.50 
B. Filing a Claim and Giving Notice 
Once a class action has been filed in federal court, the law firm repre-
senting the filing plaintiff publishes notice that the action has been filed.51 
Both the filing plaintiff and other plaintiffs implicated in the action then 
have sixty days to file lead plaintiff motions.52 The court appoints lead 
plaintiffs who are then authorized to select lead counsel and file a consoli-
dated amended complaint.53 This determination is generally made with 
consideration for the interests of the plaintiff with the largest potential 
losses.54 The process of selecting a lead plaintiff generally involves many 
plaintiff groups representing a variety of interests, while defendants play 
little role in the initial organization of the class action.55 In cases in which 
multiple lawsuits are filed by multiple plaintiffs, whichever party is selected 
                                                                                                                         
46 Id. at § 101.1[2][i].  
47 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
48 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 24, at § 101.1[2][i][i].  
49 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007). 
50 See, e.g., GSC Partners CDO Fund v. Washington, 368 F.3d 228, 237 (3d Cir. 2004); 
Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2001). 
51 See Alexander Presentation, supra note 23, at 8. 
52 About Class Actions, SPECTOR ROSEMAN KODROFF & WILLIS (2011), http://www 
.srkw-law.com/about-class-actions.html. 
53 See Alexander Presentation, supra note 23, at 7. 
54 See supra note 49. 
55 See Alexander Presentation, supra note 23, at 7. 
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as lead plaintiff files a consolidated complaint including new claims and 
new defendants.56 
C. Legal Standard for Class Certification 
A party seeking class certification must demonstrate four prerequisites: 
“(1) numerosity of plaintiffs; (2) common questions of law or fact…; (3) the 
named plaintiff’s claims and defenses are typical; and (4) the named plain-
tiff can adequately protect the interests of the class.”57 A district court must 
employ a rigorous analysis to determine whether the party seeking certifi-
cation has met these prerequisites.58 The party must provide specific facts 
to satisfy the requirements for class certification rather than resting on 
mere allegations.59 
After satisfying the four initial requirements, a party must demonstrate 
either: (1) a risk that separate actions would create incompatible standards 
of conduct for the defendant or prejudice individual class members not 
parties to the action; (2) the defendant has treated the members of the class 
as a class, making appropriate injunction or declaratory relief with respect 
to the class as a whole; or (3) common questions of law or fact predominate 
over questions affecting individual members and that a class action is a 
superior method for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the action.60 
The trial court is given broad discretion as to whether to grant or deny 
a motion for class certification.61 In doing so, the requirements of Rule 23 
should be construed liberally to recognize the rule’s policy in favor of class 
actions, and should not involve an inquiry into whether the plaintiff is 
likely to succeed on the merits of the case.62 
                                                                                                                         
56 Id. 
57 Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992); see FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23(a). 
58 See Middlesex Ret. Sys. v. Quest Software, Inc., No. 06-6863, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
132650, at *6, (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2009). 
59 Id.; see also Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(finding decertification is appropriate where the rigorous analysis standard is not met); In 
re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding mere designation as a 
class in the pleading does not suffice to maintain a class action); Doninger v. Pac. Nw. Bell, 
Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1309 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding class certification requires a statement 
of basic facts in addition to the Rule 23 allegations). 
60 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
61 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1); see also Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 
877–78 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding the district court has broad discretion in interpreting the 
prerequisites for class certification). 
62 See Yamamoto v. Omiya, 564 F.2d 1319, 1325 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Schwartz v. 
Harp, 108 F.R.D. 279, 281 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (discussing the policies underlying Rule 23). 
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D. Certification of the Class and Opting Out 
The required notice distributed to class members must inform them of 
their right to opt out of the class.63 A plaintiff would generally choose to 
opt out if, for whatever reason, (1) he decided that he did not want to be a 
part of the class, (2) he would rather bring his own suit separately, or (3) he 
is not amenable to the terms of the proposed settlement.64 In some cases, a 
settlement agreement may permit the defendant to cancel the settlement if 
too many class members opt out.65 It is worth noting that this is really only 
an issue applicable to large-scale class actions, generally those arising from 
securities fraud or products liability.66 In small claims class actions, such 
as those arising from some consumer protection claims, individual suits are 
economically infeasible given the small amount of damages at stake.67  
After discovery commences, the lead plaintiff(s) generally ask the 
court to certify the class, permitting the action to proceed as an action on 
behalf of one or more classes.68 Once a class is certified, all plaintiffs/class 
members are bound by the outcome of the proceeding, unless those indi-
viduals choose to opt out.69 
E. Settlement 
According to Rule 23(e), a class action may not be dismissed or settled 
without prior notice to the class and approval by the court.70 As mentioned 
above, very few securities class actions go to trial; almost all settle prior to 
trial.71 The mechanics of these settlements may take many different forms, 
although they generally involve counsel from all interested parties, includ-
ing insurers.72 Once the terms of the settlement are determined, parties file 
                                                                                                                         
63 See Alexander Presentation, supra note 23, at 9. 
64 See id. 
65 See id.; see also, e.g., In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 318 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(finding opt-outs by a specific percentage of the class members in a mortgage fraud class 
action may allow the settling defendants to terminate the settlement), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds. 
66 See Alexander Presentation, supra note 23, at 9; see also, e.g., In re Cmty. Bank of 
N. Va., 418 F.3d at 286. 
67 See Alexander Presentation, supra note 23, at 9. 
68 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1). 
69 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3); see also Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 
548–49 (1974) (“[I]n Rule 23(b)(3) actions the judgment shall include all those found to 
be members of the class …who have not requested exclusion.”). 
70 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
71 See Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). 
72 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 13.11 (2004). 
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extensive briefs on the fairness of the settlement, and the court must pre-
liminarily approve them.73 
After the settlement is approved, all class members are provided with 
notice and a hearing at which they have the opportunity to argue that the 
settlement is inadequate.74 The settlement is not officially approved until after 
the “fairness hearing.”75 It is not uncommon for judges to take an active role 
in the crafting of the settlement terms; they will often—especially in large 
class actions—insist on modifications in the interest of fairness to absent 
class members.76 
F. Measuring Damages 
Measuring damages in securities class actions can be a difficult task 
and often involves large sums of money. There are several tools that plain-
tiffs use to estimate damages in the class action context, among these, the 
“constant dollar inflation model” and the “constant percentage model.”77 
Under the constant dollar method, damages are calculated based on available 
public information used to measure the decline in the value of a company’s 
stock as a result of the alleged “corrective disclosure” (i.e., the disclosure 
alleged to have revealed the alleged fraud) and assumes that that decrease is 
the actual measure of artificial inflation resulting from fraud.78 Alterna-
tively, the constant percentage model takes the percentage decline of the 
residual drop, and applies that percentage to the stock price throughout the 
entire class period.79 In general, securities class actions settle for a small 
fraction of the actual estimated damages.80 
                                                                                                                         
73 See Alexander Presentation, supra note 23, at 9. 
74 See id. at 8. 
75 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2); see also Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 616 F.2d 305, 
314 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that district court’s review of a class action settlement includes 
a preliminary, pre-notice hearing and a fairness hearing at which class members and all in-
terested parties have an opportunity to be heard), overruled by Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 
873, 875 (7th Cir. 1998) on other grounds; Alexander Presentation, supra note 23, at 9. 
76 See Alexander Presentation, supra note 23, at 9. 
77 See, e.g., Jeff G. Hammel & B. John Casey, Sizing Securities Fraud Damages: 
‘Constant Percentage’ on Way Out?, 241 N.Y.L.J. 1, 1 (2009). 
78 See id. 
79 See id. at 1–2. For a greater discussion of damage calculations in the securities con-
text, see Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005) (finding considerations in 
economic loss calculation may include not only an inflated purchase price but also other 
factors, such as “changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new 
industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events ….”). 
80 See, e.g., John D. Finnerty & Gautam Goswami, Determinants of the Settlement 
Amount in Securities Fraud Class Action Litigation, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 453, 461, 479 
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II. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OF FUND MANAGERS 
This Part sets forth the groundwork for this Note’s discussion of opt-
outs in terms of fiduciary duties. Section A provides an in-depth summary 
of the seminal Cox and Thomas study along with its criticisms, which 
provides a useful framework for analyzing opt-outs. Section B gives an 
overview of the recent Cornerstone study that sheds new light on the role 
of opt-outs in securities class actions. 
A. Participation Failure in Securities Class Action Settlements: 
Cox & Thomas Study  
The empirical study by Cox and Thomas was the first to explore the 
participation—or surprising lack thereof—of financial institutions in the 
securities class action settlement environment.81 Following a preliminary 
survey of institutional investors, the study proffers four broad hypotheses 
as to why this problematic inaction may exist. 
First, the study identifies a host of issues associated with what it terms 
“[s]leeping with the [e]nemy.”82 The realities of agency costs often result 
in perverse actions on the part of managers seeking to maximize their own 
utility rather than that of the firm’s owners or beneficiaries.83 Further, the 
study recognizes the complexity of the financial services industry and the 
inevitability of conflicts that result from managers asserting their rights to 
a certain share of settlement funds in a given case.84 Classes of financial 
institutions—banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies, for example—
often cater to companies and accounting firms in the course of their business, 
the very institutions that are often the targets of securities class action law 
suits.85 It is easy to see how such relationships among market participants 
through social forces could engender conflicting attitudes with respect to fil-
ing class action claims by “align[ing] themselves with protagonists of their 
                                                                                                                         
(2006) (explaining an empirical study involving data sets between 1995 and 2005 indicates 
that the settlement amount averages approximately 3.60% of the estimated damages). 
81 See Cox & Thomas, supra note 5, at 425. Part II of that article delves deeper into the 
settlement methodology and results, which involves, among other information-gathering 
tactics, conversations with market participants. For the purposes of this Note, we set aside 
the in-depth methodology and raw results of the authors’ study. 
82 Id.  
83 See id. The study notes that a host of regulatory efforts have aimed to shape the in-
centives of fund managers, particularly those related to proxy rules and significant share-
holder disclosures for publicly traded companies. See id. at 425–26. 
84 See id. at 427. 
85 See id. 
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clientele.”86 Further evidence indicates that an institution that considers its 
principal purpose to be something other than establishing and monitoring 
procedures to ensure its participation in class action settlements may be 
inherently unlikely to institute such practices.87 
The second hypothesis identified by the study may be categorized as the 
practical and logistical considerations inherent in the claim filing process. 
A survey of class action settlements finds that on average settlement notices 
are not circulated until more than twenty-six months after the end of the 
class action period.88 Practically speaking, this means that there often passes 
in excess of three years between the time at which an institution trades in 
securities giving rise to the action, and when notice of that action is actually 
brought to the institution’s attention.89 The implication of such a delay un-
doubtedly affects whether an institution is likely to file a claim. Cox and 
Thomas point out that most financial institutions do not actually manage 
their own funds; rather, these funds are managed by a variety of different 
investment advisors.90 A given investment fund frequently reviews the per-
formance of its subsidiary advisors, “terminating its relationship with under-
performing advisors and substituting in their places those who emerge 
from ongoing beauty contests.”91The role of investment advisers in client 
class action claims is undoubtedly a complicated one that varies from firm 
to firm.92 
The study also found that many institutional investors relied on custo-
dian banks to conduct their claim filing, which also changed with relative 
frequency.93 The flux in investment advisors and custodian banks is par-
ticularly important in that these are often the institutions responsible for 
back-office duties such as filing claims.94 It has never been the custom of 
departing investment advisors or banks to forward trading records neces-
sary to evaluate whether provable claims exist; in essence, information is 
unavailable to assess the claim-worthiness of a particular trade.95 
                                                                                                                         
86 Id. Cox and Thomas note that no recorded case exists where a bank or insurance 
company acted as lead plaintiff in a securities class action case. Id. They also note the 
prevalence of “strike suits” and recognize that institutions may have perverse incentives 
to participate in a case that they believe is just extorting the company. Id. 
87 See id. at 428 (“[S]ubmitting claims is likely to be viewed as subsidiary to what the 
firm perceives to be its primary operations.”). 
88 See id. at 429. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 Id. 
92 See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
93 See Cox & Thomas, supra note 5. at 429. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. 
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These problems are only compounded when one considers the addi-
tional challenges of providing notice of a class action to a terminated invest-
ment advisor; not surprisingly, notice, if not lost to the passage of time, is 
difficult to achieve.96 Incentives in this complex structure are likewise often 
perverse in that a terminated advisor is unlikely to reap any benefit for call-
ing a former client’s attention to an arisen claim.97 
The third hypothesis stems from public perceptions of securities class 
actions, even following the PLSRA, which remain predominantly negative.98 
In general, this perception involves small monetary awards for class members 
and substantial fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys.99 This is generally supported 
by recovery statistics that suggest that settlements yield small recoveries of 
ten cents per each dollar of provable losses.100 Given this perception, it is 
understandable why fund managers would be hesitant to devote substantial 
financial resources to monitoring systems for class action claims.  
Some managers might argue that it is not cost-effective to institute such 
processes, which would include identifying and processing a claim, when 
weighed against their primary role as securities traders.101 Cox and Thomas 
offer no evidence as to the prevalence of this perception among fund man-
agers; however, they do suggest that such concerns may be overstated and/ 
or underexplored given the low administrative costs required to identify and 
process claims.102 
The fourth and last hypothesis functions as a catch-all for a lack of mon-
itoring by the management of a given institution.103 Such failures may be 
remedied by clearly specifying in the contracts with custodians, advisors, 
or brokers the procedures for which one should file a claim.104 Unclear obli-
gations, requirements, and mutual misunderstandings as communicated by 
financial institutions clearly function as a barrier to effective claim moni-
toring. The study further suggests that lines of authority are often blurred 
within institutions.105 
B. Results of the Cox & Thomas Study 
In fact, the Cox and Thomas study spurred a wave of litigation against 
mutual fund advisers in federal courts across the country for failure to file 
                                                                                                                         
96 See id. at 430. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. at 431. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. at 432. 
104 See id. 
105 See id. 
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claims on behalf of their funds and their shareholders.106 The claims were 
brought under the theories articulated by Cox and Thomas against mutual 
fund companies, individual fund directors and trustees, and fund advisers and 
sub-advisers, seeking monetary damages, disgorgement of fees, punitive 
damages, and lawyers’ fees.107 Many of these cases were voluntarily dis-
missed “because the complaints were based on bad facts” and because the 
courts were reluctant to take an expansive reading of section 36(a) of the 
Investment Company Act, as well as other technicalities.108 
The Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) reacted to the Cox and 
Thomas article as well by “seeking information on advisers’ procedures 
for identifying, evaluating and pursuing legal class action claims for secu-
rities held in client accounts and related records.”109 The SEC’s Office of 
Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) sought information on 
(1) adviser processes for identifying situations in which clients may be eli-
gible to participate in class actions; (2) policies and procedures for such; and 
(3) the number and amount of previous class action recoveries in which 
the advisers’ clients participated.110  
Practitioners interpreted these inquiries as a signal to investment ad-
visers that the SEC believed they had a “legal responsibility to monitor for 
class actions involving their clients’ portfolio securities and to decide whether 
to participate ....”111 Stone and Helmrich articulate several reasons why 
acting on class actions exceeds the typical responsibility and authority of 
investment advisers: 
• The authority for handling class action claims rests with the 
client and does not flow accordingly to the investment ad-
viser unless specified by contract. This comes down to an 
issue of custom in the drafting of advisory agreements, 
which do not generally grant power of attorney to the ad-
viser to pursue litigation on behalf of the client.112 
                                                                                                                         
106 See Steven Stone & Ryan F. Helmrich, The Role of Investment Advisers in Client 
Class Action Claims, 12 THE INVESTMENT LAWYER 10, at 17 (2005). Stone and Helmrich 
note that this series of lawsuits identified over 130 class actions for which mutual fund 
advisers failed to submit proofs of claims to collect settlement proceeds. Id.  
107 Id.   
108 Id. at 18. As of publication in 2005, Stone and Helmrich note that “this may signal 
the beginning of the end of the recent wave of class actions against large fund groups and 
their advisers on processing class action claims ....” Id.  
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 Id. (“[I]t is troubling when the OCIE enters the fray, hinting at responsibilities that 
are not established as a matter of law ....”).  
112 Id. at 18–19 (“[S]uch authority [to execute a proof of claim], for example, ‘cannot 
be established by stockbrokers only demonstrating that they have discretionary authority 
to trade stock in anothers’ accounts.’”).  
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• Cox and Thomas fail to “parse the fine distinctions between 
the roles of different in-house and outside fiduciaries.”113 
As discussed above, in the mutual fund context, the roles of 
various advisers, managers, and custodians are defined in a 
way that is dissimilar to that of, for example, ERISA, which 
defines the duties of such actors differently vis-à-vis class 
action participation.114 
• Whether a client participates in a class action is beyond the 
expertise and abilities of an investment adviser, who is 
charged solely with the question of whether investment in a 
given security is prudent.115 
Stone and Helmrich sum up their analysis with a series of “Best Prac-
tices” for, presumably, ’40 Act attorneys and their clients, which suggest 
careful attention to the contractual obligations of the adviser in its invest-
ment adviser agreement, as well as a clear designation of the parties re-
sponsible for receiving and transmitting class action notices.116  
C. Complications Resulting from Opt-Outs: What Does This Mean for 
Fund Managers? 
The recent Cornerstone study looking at opt-out cases in securities class 
action settlements is the impetus behind this Note.117  Expanding upon 
previous work from Stanford’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, the 
report provides a comprehensive analysis of publicly available information 
on securities class actions in which at least one class member has opted to 
pursue a separate lawsuit against the defendant.118 The report surveyed 
                                                                                                                         
113 Id. at 19.  
114 Id. It is worth noting that Stone and Helmrich, though not directly addressing the ques-
tion of manager responsibilities, acknowledge that managers may have fiduciary duties to par-
ticipate in class actions: “This position does not invariably mean that this responsibility 
flows with the appointment of an investment manager down to an adviser ....” Id. 
115 Id. at 19–20. In relation to this argument, Stone and Helmrich make note of the com-
plicating analysis posed by opt-outs, which they assume as a matter of fact is well beyond 
the expertise of an investment advisor. Id. at 20.  
116 Id. 
117 See Rozen, supra note 10, at 1; see also Opt-Outs: A Worrisome Trend in Securities 
Class Action Litigation, 2 OAKBRIDGE INSIGHTS, 1, 1 (2007), http://clients.oakbridgeins 
.com/newsletters/April_Opt-OutsAWorrisomeTrendinSecuritiesClassActionLitigation.pdf 
(suggesting in response to the massive Time-Warner opt-out that the “recent wave of ... opt-
out settlements could completely change the way securities fraud lawsuits are resolved in 
the future”). 
118 See Rozen, supra note 10, at 1. 
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1,272 securities class action settlements from between 1996 and 2011, 
identifying thirty-eight settlements in which at least one plaintiff opted to 
pursue a separate case against the defendant.119 A summary of the report’s 
key findings follows: 
• Plaintiffs were more likely to bring opt-out cases when larger 
class action settlements were at stake.120 
• Opt-out settlements represented 12.5 percent of the value of 
the class action settlements, and a median of 3.8 percent of 
the value.121 
• Between 1996 and 2006, there were six cases in which the 
opt-out settlements represented more than twenty percent 
of the total settlement value.122 
• For the period surveyed, Cornerstone found seven opt-out 
cases with settlements above ten million dollars.123 
• Pension funds were the most frequent to opt-out, followed 
by other types of asset management companies.124 
• Overall and based on the anecdotal evidence obtained in the 
survey, opting-out carries a greater risk, but with the poten-
tial for significantly greater reward, depending upon the cir-
cumstances of the case.125 
In general, most securities class action cases are either dismissed or 
settled.126 As the study finds, the amount of the settlement is the greatest 
predictor of whether opt-outs will follow—as the settlement gets larger, 
plaintiffs are more likely to opt out.127 The frequency of opt-outs may 
increase in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent reversal of its decision 
to hear a case concerning the timing of investor opt-out rights.128 The 
                                                                                                                         
119 Id. 
120 Id. Of those cases with settlements of $500 million or more, fifty-three percent in-






126 Id. at 2. 
127 Id. at 3. The study notes that this may not be indicative of trends in securities class 
actions throughout the course of recent history. Id. For example, following the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995, studies suggested that plaintiffs opted out of 
class actions for other reasons than to pursue their own legal action. Id. at 2. 
128 See Stephanie Russell Kraft, Securities Cases to Watch in 2015, LAW360 (Jan 2, 
2015, 3:07 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/600266/securities-cases-to-watch-in-2015 
(“In a brief order, the high court dismissed as improvidently granted its writ of certiorari to 
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reversal leaves in place a split between the Second and Tenth Circuits as 
to whether a timely filed class action operates to suspend the statute of 
limitations as well as the ‘33 Act’s statute of repose.129 The result of this, 
as some have suggested, is to encourage litigants in securities class actions 
who “fear they won’t be able to bring their claims after an unfavorable set-
tlement is reached” to opt out.130 There is currently no indication whether 
the Supreme Court will reassess this issue in 2015.  
In terms of settlement amounts for the publicly available cases sur-
veyed, the average total opt-out was $85.4 million, or 12.5 percent of the 
average class action settlement in these cases.131 More specifically,  
The largest set of opt-out settlements related to a single case was AOL 
Time Warner, Inc., where the $764 million of opt-out settlements was 
30.6 percent of the size of the class action settlement. The largest opt-out 
settlement amount as a percentage of the class action settlement was 
Qwest Communications International Inc., where the $411 million opt-
out settlement was 92.4 percent of the final class action settlement.132 
The study suggests that the potential for larger class action settlements 
in the future may signal a greater frequency of opt-outs to come.133  By 
virtue of their size, these settlements engender significant publicity, as was 
the case in Time Warner and Qwest.  
                                                                                                                         
the Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi, which had been looking to over-
turn a 2013 Second Circuit decision that blocked it and other plaintiffs from intervening in a 
putative class action accusing IndyMac [and others] of misrepresenting certain mortgage-
backed securities.”). 
129 Id.  
130 Id. (quoting Stephen Tountas, founding partner at Bleichmar Fonti Tountas & Aud 
LLP: “With what’s in play right with IndyMac, any opt-out that happens after the statute of 
limitations and statute of repose runs the risk of getting nothing”); see also Kevin LaCroix, 
The Top D&O Stories of 2014, THE D&O DIARY (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.dandodiary 
.com/2015/01/articles/director-and-officer-liability/the-top-ten-do-stories-of-2014-2/ (“If 
the filing of a class action lawsuit does not toll the statute of repose, current practice 
regarding class action opt-outs could be significantly affected.”).  
131 See Rozen, supra note 10, at 2. These numbers are skewed by the small sample 
size and wide distribution of settlement amounts. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 3; see also Bailey Cavalieri LLC, Securities Class Action Opt-Out Claims: A 
Growing Problem, available at http://www.baileycavalieri.com/articles.html (discussing 
the growing trend in opt-outs and its implications for director and officer defendants).  
The trend of institutional opt-outs is likely to continue as institutions are 
able to leverage greater settlements than they would as members of a class, 
as plaintiffs’ counsel are able to reap huge fees in the opt-out claims, and 
as elected officials who control some of the public institutional investors 
tout the financial benefits of their recoveries for political gain.  
Id.  
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From a strategic standpoint, the study suggests that fund managers and 
their custodian banks should pay greater attention to the frequency of such 
opt-outs, and adjust their management practices accordingly. As discussed 
earlier, many of the recurring plaintiffs in opt-out cases were pension funds, 
which accounted for sixteen of the thirty-four cases studied.134 Fourteen 
opt-out cases involved mutual funds, hedge funds, or other investment 
companies.135 All of these plaintiffs undoubtedly consulted with their legal 
counsel on the risks and rewards of opting out. Several plaintiffs’ law firms 
have correspondingly published on the topic.136 As Blair Nicholas and Ian 
Berg of Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman LLP discuss, “institutional 
investors should remain selective in the cases they decide to opt out from 
and carefully consider the upside and downside of the factors impacting the 
success of a particular opt-out action ....”137 They further outline the potential 
factors that sophisticated institutional investors should consider when for-
mulating an opt-out strategy, such as (1) the opportunity for increased recov-
ery, (2) broader claims for recovery in a direct state court action, (3) levels 
of control over the litigation and settlement, (4) availability of alternative 
claims, and (5) ability to overcome certain jurisdictional issues, among 
other factors.138 
The array of factors that an institutional investor plaintiff should con-
sider in its opt-out strategy is boundless. And while pressure to opt out 
may increase in the face of large-scale opt-out recoveries in the news, in-
stitutional investors should be equally mindful of the risks of pursuing 
individual claims.139 This means a “thorough factual and legal analysis of 
the merits of the potential opt-out claims for recovery ....”140 The question 
                                                                                                                         
134 See Rozen, supra note 10, at 3. Seven of nineteen cases brought between 1996 and 
2005 involved the Florida State Board of Administration. Id.  
135 Id. (“Fifteen opt-out cases involved individual shareholders who were not identified 
as former employees or subsidiaries, and four involved shareholders of companies that were 
brought by or otherwise affiliated with the defendant.”). 
136 See, e.g., Blair A. Nicholas & Ian D. Berg, Why Institutional Investors Opt-Out of 
Securities Fraud Class Actions and Pursue Direct Individual Actions, PRAC. LAW INST. 
(Oct. 15, 2009), available at http://www.blbglaw.com/news/media_mentions/00104. 
137 Id. at 7.  
138 See id. for a greater discussion of the less obvious benefits of opting out. The myriad 
jurisdictional and governance related benefits discussed by Nicholas and Berg are beyond 
the scope of this Note; however, they serve to further highlight the complex calculus that 
institutional investors should engage in when confronted with a large-scale securities 
class action. 
139 Id. Nicholas and Berg discuss the opportunity for increased recovery in the context 
of the highly publicized AOL/Time Warner, Qwest, and Tyco International securities liti-
gations. Id. at 2.  
140 Id. at 7.  
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arises whether an institutional investor can be held liable for failure to en-
gage in such a comprehensive analysis with respect to opt-out possibilities. 
One might also ask whether an institutional investor can be held liable for 
failing to opt out when it is clear that doing so would reap a greater set-
tlement award (in some cases, perhaps as large as the overall class action 
settlement). And lastly, if an institutional investor takes a risk and opts out 
only to receive nothing, should beneficiaries be able to sue for their esti-
mated portion of the class action settlement? The following discussion 
suggests a legal framework within which to consider these questions. 
D. Caremark, the Duty of Good Faith, and Monitoring Obligations 
1. Caremark Background 
Given the dearth of scholarship related to class action claim filing and 
the role of fund managers,141 it is difficult to devise an appropriate legal 
standard with which to analyze their duties in the opt-out context. While 
traditional approaches to the duty of loyalty and duty of care may be appli-
cable or instructive in some cases, Cox and Thomas suggest that Caremark 
should be the appropriate standard.142 Although not entirely distinguishable 
from the canon of duty of care and loyalty cases, Caremark stands for the 
proposition that corporate officers have a duty to make a good faith effort 
to assure that corporate information and reporting systems are adequate and 
up-to-date, and that failure to do so may render a director liable for losses.143 
Caremark involved employees’ alleged violations of federal and state 
laws governing health care providers, namely the Anti-Referral Payments 
Law (ARPL), which prohibits health care providers from paying remuner-
ation to induce Medicare and Medicaid patient referrals.144 Caremark was 
actively involved in contracting for services through consultation agreements 
and research grants with physicians, who then recommended Caremark prod-
ucts and services to Medicare and Medicaid patients.145 
Caremark’s uniqueness stems from the company’s pre-existing internal 
controls, as well as its actions following investigations by both the United 
                                                                                                                         
141 See generally Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: 
The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895 (1992); Cox & Thomas, supra note 5; 
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Role in Class Action 
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
142 See Cox & Thomas, supra note 5, at 439–40. 
143 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
144 Id. at 960. 
145 Id. at 962. 
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States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ).146 Prior to both investigations, Caremark had distrib-
uted an intra-company Guide to Contractual Relationships to all employees, 
which set forth the company’s policy that “no payments would be made in 
exchange for or to induce patient referrals.”147 Furthermore, Caremark as-
serted that in the year prior to the commencement of the DOJ action, it had 
made active attempts to increase supervision and oversight by centralizing its 
management structure.148 Once the investigations were initiated, Caremark 
instituted multiple corporate actions aimed at improving its employee moni-
toring mechanisms overall.149 
The company ultimately entered into a settlement agreement with fed-
eral authorities and several private insurance companies in which no senior 
officers or directors were charged with corporate wrongdoing.150 The settle-
ment terms proposed, among other provisions: (1) that Caremark undertake 
not to pay any compensation to third parties, physicians, or business combi-
nations in which it had a financial interest in exchange for referrals; (2) that 
the Board semi-annually discuss material changes in government healthcare 
regulations and their effect on relationships with healthcare providers; (3) that 
patients receive written disclosure of any relationship between Caremark 
and health care providers making referrals; (4) that the Board establish a com-
pliance and ethics committee to monitor business segment compliance with 
the APRL; and (5) that corporate officers responsible for various business 
segments report to the compliance and ethics committee and get advanced 
approval of any new forms of contract.151 
2. Legal Standards 
The court in Caremark reviewed the settlement terms to determine 
whether they were “fair and reasonable,” ultimately concluding that they 
                                                                                                                         
146 Id. at 965. 
147 Id. at 962. The case further notes that general confusion existed amongst Caremark’s 
management as to the legality of their contracting activities, even though they were unaware 
of any kickbacks or remuneration. Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 962–63. Among these actions, Caremark: (1) announced that it would no 
longer pay management fees to physicians for services to Medicare and Medicare patients; 
(2) revised and published an updated version of its Contractual Relationships Guide, re-
quiring regional officers to approve transactions entered into with physicians; (3) hired 
PriceWaterhouse to conduct an assessment of its control structure (of which they found 
no material weaknesses); and (4) increased staff education with regard to the ARPL and 
use of Caremark’s form contracts. Id. 
150 Id. at 965. 
151 Id. at 966. 
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were in light of their perceived “positive consequences,” regardless of what 
the court identified as an overall “weakness of the plaintiffs’claims.”152 In 
discerning an appropriate legal standard under which to judge the settlement, 
the court acknowledged that the complaint “[did] not charge either director 
self-dealing or the more difficult loyalty-type problems arising from ... sus-
pect director motivation ....”153 The court highlighted the appropriate stan-
dard for duty of care cases, which is “whether there was good faith effort to 
be informed and exercise judgment,”154 noting that this formulation does 
not necessarily apply to the Caremark case. 
Rather, the court considered liability for the failure to monitor in the 
Caremark context, which implicated a loss not as a result of a particular 
decision made by management, but rather from unconsidered action.155 
This alternative theory recognizes that the vast majority of the decisions that 
a corporation makes stem from its employees acting on its behalf as agents, 
not from corporate officers.156 Because the actions of agents—whether they 
are employees, traders, or fund managers—inevitably have the ability to 
affect the welfare of the corporation, the appropriate inquiry should be to 
ask, “what is the board’s responsibility with respect to the organization and 
                                                                                                                         
152 Id. at 970, 972. 
153 Id. at 967 (“The theory here advanced is possibly the most difficult theory in cor-
poration law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment. There are good policy 
reasons why it is so difficult to charge directors with responsibility for corporate losses for 
an alleged breach of care, where there is no conflict of interest or no facts suggesting sus-
pect motivation involved ....”) (citing Gagliardi v. Tri-Foods Int’l Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 
(Del. Ch. 1996)). There are two contexts in which breach of fiduciary duty may arise in 
connection with a corporate loss: (1) from a situation in which the Board makes a deci-
sion that results in loss because that decision was either ill-advised or negligently made; 
or (2) from a failure of the Board to act in a situation in which due attention would have 
prevented a loss. See Veasey & Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised Model 
Act, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1484–93 (1985). See generally Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 
Del. 2006); In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006);  In re Soporex, 
Inc., 463 B.R. 344, 367 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011) (discussing how the duty of loyalty now 
encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith). As the Soporex court 
notes, the duty to act in good faith is relatively uncharted, even given the wealth of case 
law addressing it. Id. at 368. 
154 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968 (summarizing Judge Learned Hand’s formulation in 
Barnes v. Andrews, 204 N.Y.S. 326 (N.Y. App. Div. 1924)). The court discusses duty of 
care cases at greater length in the context of the business judgment rule. Id. While the 
breadth of case law surrounding the business judgment rule is beyond the scope of this 
Note, the Caremark court notes that a proper understanding of the rule’s application 
requires “consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process employed [by the 
Board].”Id. at 967 (discussing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. Supr. 1984)). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 968. 
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monitoring of the enterprise to assure that the corporation functions within 
the law to achieve its purposes?”157 The claim, in such a case, is that the 
directors or officers should have known about the insubordinate behavior 
of its employees, and if they had known, then they would be under a fidu-
ciary duty to bring the employees into compliance and spare the company 
the loss.158 
The court in Caremark revisited its previous ruling in Graham, con-
cluding that corporate boards cannot satisfy their obligation to be reason-
ably informed about corporate activities (including those of its agents)  
without assuring themselves that information and reporting systems exist 
in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior man-
agement and to the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to 
allow management and the board, each within its scope, to reach in-
formed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with 
law and its business performance.159 
Articulating the new standard, Chancellor Allen concluded that directors 
have a duty to attempt in good faith to assure (1) that corporate information 
gathering and reporting systems exist, (2) that the board has concluded that 
such reporting systems are adequate, and (3) that failure to do so—under 
circumstances not articulated in Caremark—may render a director liable for 
losses.160 Admittedly, this test for liability presents a high burden, requir-
ing a “lack of good faith as evidenced by sustained or systematic failure of 
a director to exercise reasonable oversight ….”161 
The Delaware Supreme Court goes on to explain that a demanding test 
for liability in cases like Caremark is justified in the oversight context, 
and is beneficial overall to classes of shareholders in that it “makes board 
service by qualified persons more likely, while continuing to act as a stim-
ulus to good faith performance of duty by such directors.”162 This notion 
                                                                                                                         
157 Id. at 968–69. 
158 See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 132 (Del. 1963). Nota-
bly in Graham, the court found no basis for concluding that the directors had breached their 
fiduciary duty to remain informed of the ongoing operations of the firm, based on the facts 
presented. Id. Graham represents the Delaware Supreme Court’s initial reluctance to extend 
director liability to cases involving failure to monitor. Id. As the court in Caremark points 
out, more recent case law with regard to takeovers highlighted the evolving role of the corpo-
rate board, and the increased monitoring obligations required of board members. 698 A.2d at 
970 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Paramount Communications 
v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)). 
159 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 971. 
162 Id. 
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of encouraging qualified and competent leaders to serve on boards and in 
management roles is one that comes up frequently in the fiduciary duties 
cases and serves as a relevant consideration in the context of opt-outs. 
Affirming and clarifying the court’s ruling in Caremark, Stone v. Ritter 
explicitly approved the standard for oversight liability.163 The court out-
lined the necessary conditions for director oversight liability: 
(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information 
system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, 
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling 
themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their at-
tention.... Where directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act ... 
they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary ob-
ligation in good faith.164 
Decisions since Stone have not added much additional factual or legal 
basis for determining when and under what circumstances a fiduciary’s fail-
ure to act constitutes a breach of duty.165 Most recently in In re Citigroup 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, the Court of Chancery of Delaware 
seemed to signal a retreat to the business judgment rule instead of extend-
ing the director oversight liability to claims alleging failure to monitor 
business risk.166  
The case involved Citigroup’s participation in the subprime mortgage 
market in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis and whether the 
board ignored “red flags” resulting in inappropriate business risk.167 The 
court acknowledged and affirmed the duties of oversight that emerged from 
Caremark, but was reluctant to extend them to the factual circumstances 
of the case.168 Rather, the court suggested that the theory should be con-
strained to those cases that do not look to make directors “personally liable 
for making (or allowing to be made) business decisions that, in hindsight, 
turned out poorly for the Company.”169 The court held that the obligation 
to implement and monitor a system of oversight 
does not eviscerate the core protections of the business judgment rule—
protection designed to allow corporate managers and directors to pursue 
                                                                                                                         
163 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006). 
164 Id. at 370. 
165 See, e.g., In re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83, 2011 
WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011); Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 
2009); Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
166 964 A.2d 106, 129–30 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
167 Id. at 124. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
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risky transactions without the specter of being held personally liable if 
those decisions turn out poorly.... [T]he burden to show bad faith is even 
higher.... [A]nd the difficulty of proving a Caremark claim ... function[s] 
to place an extremely high burden on a plaintiff to state a claim for per-
sonal director liability for a failure to see the extent of a company’s busi-
ness risk.170 
In sum, there is no doubt that Delaware courts, as the preeminent crea-
tors and enforcers of corporate law, recognize an obligation of good faith 
in connection with corporate monitoring and oversight systems following 
Caremark and Stone. Nevertheless, the particular factual circumstances 
under which a director or officer may be held liable under this theory re-
main unclear, as does the degree to which that theory might be extended to 
other contexts, such as the monitoring of class action claims. As Citigroup 
suggests, at least in recent years, Delaware courts are unlikely to extend 
monitoring standards to factual circumstances that would otherwise receive 
traditional business judgment rule treatment. This careful balancing of the 
business judgment rule alongside Caremark and its progeny gets at the heart 
of this Note and the unique circumstances that influence a fund manager’s 
decision to opt out of a class action.  
III. SHOULD FIDUCIARY DUTIES EXTEND TO CLASS ACTION 
OPT-OUT SCENARIOS? 
A. Caremark in the Opt-Out Context: Expanding Monitoring Obligations? 
In discussing whether fiduciaries should be exposed to liability for fail-
ure to monitor the risks and rewards of opt-outs, I begin by setting forth a 
potential claim under the Caremark standard. Accordingly, I address a host 
of issues unique to securities class actions that make such an extension of 
liability inappropriate. 
Again, it is worth noting that fiduciary duties have never been extended 
to the claim filing process, neither to encourage investment fund managers 
to file claims in the first place nor to impose additional duties to assess 
recovery prospects in connection with a potential opt-out.171 
                                                                                                                         
170 Id. at 125 (holding that to entertain claims brought under these facts would under-
mine the long-established protections of the business judgment rule). 
171 See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 132 (Del. 1963); In 
re Citigroup Shareholder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 129–30 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
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1. Failure to Implement Monitoring Systems 
As the law currently stands under Caremark, a claim against an in-
vestment fund fiduciary would have to allege that the directors failed to 
implement any monitoring or information system or controls with respect 
to claim monitoring.172 This clearly fits more squarely with the obligations 
suggested by Cox and Thomas: “[I]n order to satisfy their oversight respon-
sibilities, the trustees of institutional investors must, in good faith, insure 
that their fund has an adequate system in place to identify and process the 
funds’claims.”173 
Cox and Thomas go on to claim that the standard is in no way onerous, 
which is compelling in the case of “opt-ins,”although much less so in the 
case of opt-outs.174 Recognizing the differences between the two alternatives 
at issue, it is much easier to argue that monitoring obligations extend to 
some activity that actually involves some form of monitoring, that is, staying 
abreast of potential claims to which the fund might be entitled to recover as 
a class member. This type of monitoring would not require drastic altera-
tions in business practice,175 and would likely only reshape the roles of 
current employees involved in the fund’s daily trading activities.176  
As a practical matter, the Delaware courts would first have to recognize 
a fiduciary duty to file claims in a securities class action before it would be 
possible to extend the theory any further. Alleging failure to implement a 
particular system related to opt-outs would not only presume the existence 
of a well-functioning system to process and track claims initially, but would 
also prove unduly onerous when compared with the system advocated for 
by Cox and Thomas.177 All of the steps that they outline to achieve better 
monitoring practices in this context, with the exception of creating a cen-
tralized clearing house, serve as mere modifications to existing systems.178 
For example, 13F filing requirements already exist, regardless of whether 
institutions abide by them. Nudging fund managers toward compliance 
                                                                                                                         
172 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
173 Cox & Thomas, supra note 5, at 440 (“[T]hey [fiduciaries] should establish a mon-
itoring mechanism to insure that this system is adequate, and if they learn it is inadequate, 
they must take measures to fix the problems.”). 
174 Id. at 440–41. 
175 Id. at 441. 
176 Id. 
177 See generally id. at 442–49 (outlining several easy steps to ensure that institutions 
receive their fair share, including establishing a centralized information clearinghouse, stan-
dardizing trading documentation and claims forms, improving institutional monitoring and 
claims filing, strengthening institutions’ 13F filing requirements, and improving claims 
filing systems overall). 
178 Id. 
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under existing frameworks presents a much more feasible solution than one 
which requires development of an entirely new system altogether. 
Opt-outs involve an inherent level of uncertainty and risk that makes 
them unfit for traditional fiduciary liability. To be sure, very few plaintiffs’
law firms currently in practice offer opt-out counseling and analysis as a 
substantive practice area.179 Of those that do, many go out of their way to 
stress the degree of balancing that an opt-out analysis requires.180 Without 
question, there is a potential for greater recovery; however, with the poten-
tial for similar losses, there is little reason to thrust such a calculus upon a 
given fund manager.181 
The other issue that stems from extending this duty to fund managers is 
the degree to which a fiduciary’s decision-making process would still be 
subject to the business judgment rule. Imagine a scenario where the fund 
manager, acting as trustee on behalf of his investor clients determines, based 
on his own calculus, that it would be advantageous to opt out of a particular 
class action and pursue a separate private action in the hopes of gaining a 
greater recovery. He acts on this calculation, and it turns out that his separate 
action is not permitted. The plaintiff beneficiary receives nothing. Should 
the fiduciary be liable for the extent of the damages that would have been 
recovered had he not opted out? The flip side of this hypothetical is that 
corporate actions by fiduciaries are generally subject to the business judg-
ment rule182 and would be given deference under that standard, even if they 
resulted in an aggregate loss. Nevertheless, requiring fund managers to in-
crease their level of risk taking in an activity that currently lacks scholarly 
or legal acceptance is problematic. 
2. Failure to Monitor Systems Once Implemented 
The alternative to the “failure to implement” claim under Caremark 
would be to argue that after having implemented such a system or con-
trols, the fiduciary consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations, 
                                                                                                                         
179 An exhaustive search of firms that market themselves as having knowledge in the 
realm of opt-outs yields surprisingly abysmal results. See, e.g., Nicole Lavallee, Practical 
Matters: When Should Funds Opt-Out of a Class Action?, BERMAN DIVALERIO (last visited 
Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.bermandevalerio.com/NEWS/FIRM-NEWSLETTER/67-PRAC 
TICAL-MATTERS-WHEN-SHOULD-FUNDS-OPT-OUT-OF-A-CLASS-ACTION (“Each 
fact pattern gives rise to unique issues and there is no one-size-fits-all solution.”); Repre-
senting Opt-Outs in Class Actions, BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C. (last visited Sept. 2, 2014), 
http://www.bergermontague.com/PRACTICE-AREAS/REPRESENTING-OPT-OUTS-IN
 -CLASS-ACTIONS. 
180 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
181 See Lavallee, supra note 154; see also Representing Opt-Outs, supra note 154. 
182 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
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thus failing to discharge his or her duty of good faith.183 Similarly, this 
claim rests on the preexistence of some sort of monitoring system, one that 
would both identify claims as they arise, and then weigh their subjective 
risks and rewards.184 Given the dearth of current scholarship on opt-out 
valuation,185 it is unlikely that such a claim would prevail under Delaware 
law as it stands. 
Beyond the inapplicability of Delaware law, the fundamental policy ra-
tionales behind Rule 23 and the PSLRA likewise point away from extend-
ing fiduciary duties.186 As discussed previously, the class action is a device 
meant to solve a collective action problem that recognizes both individual 
plaintiff and defendant limitations in light of large-scale damages.187 Any-
thing that diminishes the predictability of the class action model or that sys-
tematically undermines its ability to distribute limited settlement funds, is 
likewise contrary to Congressional intent in drafting the rules. 
CONCLUSION 
“Letting Billions [of dollars] Slip Through [anyone’s] Fingertips,” as 
the Cox and Thomas title indicates, in whatever context, is cause for alarm 
for those who may have access that money. As previously discussed, in 
the securities class action space, the primary market participants who are 
concerned with foregone settlement profits are large institutional investors 
who manage vast portfolios on behalf of smaller investors. Given the sums 
at stake in today’s securities fraud settlements—and the even greater sums 
potentially available to opt-out plaintiffs—there is little doubt that fund 
managers with claims in securities class actions should be actively engaged in 
the process on behalf of their beneficiaries. This Note concurs with the thrust 
of the Cox and Thomas article, that extending fiduciary liability to fund 
managers to monitor class action claim filing would be minimally invasive 
in terms of adopting and integrating new policies, and would yield a posi-
tive result for both managers and investors. Delaware law has already ex-
tended such duties to similar factual circumstances in Stone and Caremark; 
thus, it would not signal a significant legal departure from existing case law. 
Furthermore, it would satisfy expectations of most investors who entrust 
                                                                                                                         
183 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
184 Id. 
185 See generally Rozen, supra note 10; Keith Sharfman, Valuation Averaging: A New 
Procedure for Resolving Valuation Disputes, 88 MINN. L. REV. 357, (2003). 
186 See Schwartz v. Harp, 108 F.R.D. 279, 281 (C.D. Cal. 1985); see also Private Secu-
rities Litigation Reform Act, supra note 43; Cox & Thomas supra note 5, at 416–21. 
187 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
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their fund managers with the task of maximizing their portfolios through 
prudent management.  
Despite the growing trend of opting out of securities class actions, fi-
duciary duties as the courts have traditionally recognized them are not the 
proper vehicles to ensure that plaintiffs receive the maximum recovery. 
Opting out—despite its potential rewards—may be incompatible with the 
fund manager’s fiduciary role. Under a regime that scrutinizes managers’ 
assessment of opt-out risks and rewards, managers may be incentivized to 
risk significant portfolio value on the possibility of success in a direct ac-
tion, rather than relying on a proportional share of the class action settle-
ment. Moreover, on the aggregate, extending fiduciary duties to the opt-out 
sphere would likely encourage strategic behavior, particularly among the 
largest institutional investors, which would undermine the collective bene-
fits of the class action system—either so many plaintiffs would opt out that 
settlements would be frequently vacated, or the pool of assets available for 
recovery would become less certain overall. Under this scenario, unsophis-
ticated investors without the financial resources to opt out would likely suf-
fer, as would the judicial system as a whole. 
Perhaps the most compelling argument against extending fiduciary du-
ties is that Delaware law as it stands does not properly square with the 
factual circumstances necessary to bring an action for failing to opt out, or 
as a more extreme example, opting out and then receiving nothing. Moni-
toring is reasonable in the opt-in context for which systems can be readily 
developed to file class action claims, the risks are minimal to investors, and 
the probability of increasing the value of the underlying portfolio is nearly 
certain. It would be impractical to encourage the development of monitor-
ing systems to assess the risk of opting out given the complexity of the risk 
calculus, and the many other factors that may influence a given institutional 
investor’s probability of success. A prudent fund manager with substantial 
resources would engage legal counsel to explore opt-out possibilities, but he 
or she should not be liable for choosing not to do so, or for preferring the 
predictability of the existing class action proceeding.  
